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Abstract
This paper analyzes provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an organization.
A moderate principal assigns a public good production to one of two extreme agents. A
contributing agent then gets the opportunity to choose a public good variety he prefers but
has to carry a cost of production. If a production cost is lower than a benet from having
their preferred public good variety implemented then the agents seek assignment. I show
that in this case the principal makes the agents compete by committing to public good
varieties they would provide if selected. The agents want to make themselves an attractive
choice and so announce moderate (still divergent) varieties if production is costly, and the
principals preferred variety if production is not costly. However, if the production cost
exceeds the benet from having their preferred public good variety implemented then the
agents want to avoid assignment. My results suggest that in this case the principal just
assigns an unpopular public good production to a less extreme agent.
JEL classication: H41.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the question of provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an
organization. Think of this as departmental service in academia, for example. That might
include committee work, seminar organizing, chair assignments, etc. All members of the
organization prefer the public good to be provided rather than not, but might disagree about
certain dimension or variety of the public good. In the context of the academia example, this
might reect research eld or methodological specialization which a¤ects the focus of seminar
series or hiring priorities. A principal (department chair or median faculty member) assigns
the public good provision to one of the agents (say, junior faculty members). A contributing
agent then gets the opportunity to provide a public good variety he prefers. However, the
public good provision involves certain costs for a contributing agent. At the same time, there
might be certain benets too. In the context of the previous example, running department
seminar series requires time but also implies greater academic visibility (useful at earlier
career stages) and probably teaching load reduction. Moreover, being a "good citizen" is
always appreciated in academic departments and might be taken into account during tenure
evaluation. Therefore, provision of some di¤erentiated public goods implies net costs for a
contributing agent while provision of others implies net benets. The agents then tend to
avoid providing some public goods but value (and therefore compete for) the opportunity to
provide others. What variety of the di¤erentiated public good will be provided in such an
institutional environment?
To address this question, I develop a spatial model in which a principal assigns provision
of a di¤erentiated public good to one of two agents. The principal prefers a moderate variety
of the public good while the agents have more extreme opposite preferences. The public good
provision implies either net cost or net benet for a contributing agent. Whether it is costly
or not, as well as the principals and the agentspreferences, is common knowledge.
The principal can adopt di¤erent selection procedures to choose an agent for the public
good provision. Here, I analyze two selection processes commonly used within organizations.
Under the rst, referred as appointment, the principal simply evaluates the agents given their
preferences, and selects a contributor on the basis of this. Intuitively, under appointment,
a selected agent would implement his preferred public good variety. The principal therefore
appoints an agent with more moderate preferences over the di¤erentiated public good. Under
the second selection procedure, referred as competition, the agents commit to public good
varieties they would provide if selected. The principal thus selects an agent who announced
a more moderate variety of the public good.
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Consider now the agentsincentives in the competition stage. I show that if the net cost
of public good provision exceeds the distance between the agentsmost preferred varieties of
the public good then the agents want to avoid being selected. Intuitively, in this case each
agent wants his counterpart to provide her preferred public good variety rather than to incur
a high cost of providing his own. Therefore, the agents will make themselves an unattractive
choice by announcing extreme varieties of the public good. As a result, the principal will
prefer appointment to competition.
However, if the net cost of public good provision is lower than the distance between the
agentsmost preferred varieties then the agents value the opportunity to provide this public
good. Indeed, each agent prefers to incur a relatively low cost of public good provision rather
than to let his counterpart implement her preferred option. I show that in this case, there
is a unique equilibrium in the competition stage. If one agent is extreme and the other
agent is relatively more moderate, this is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in
which a more moderate agent announces his preferred variety and gets selected, while a more
extreme agent announces any variety from a certain equilibrium interval. The principal is
then indi¤erent between competition and appointment. If the agentsbliss points are extreme,
this is an equilibrium with symmetric announcements in which each agent gets selected with
probability one half and the announced varieties are more moderate than the bliss points.
The principal therefore prefers competition to appointment.
My results emphasize an important feature of competition procedure  announcement
divergence in the case of costly public good provision. Indeed, a contributing agent would
bear a cost of public good provision only if his gains in terms of a public good variety
are large enough, implying that his announced variety is quite di¤erent from that of the
other agent. Another important characteristic of competition procedure is the existence of
equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which one agent announces his bliss point and
gets selected. Intuitively, if he announces a variety di¤erent from his bliss point then he can
protably deviate to its direction and still get selected for the public good provision. Thus,
in an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements a selected agent necessarily announces his
most preferred variety.
Finally, if the public good provision implies net benet for a contributing agent then the
agents compete for the opportunity to provide this public good. Then in the competition
stage, the agents will make themselves an attractive choice by announcing a preferred option
of the principal. Actually, the present setting then simplies to a classical spatial model with
policy- and o¢ ce-motivated agents analyzed by Wittman (1990) and Calvert (1985), among
many others. In equilibrium, both agents announce a preferred variety of the principal and
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each of them gets selected with equal probability. The principal thus prefers competition to
appointment.
My results therefore suggest that competition procedure is preferred in the situations in
which the costs of public good provision are lower than the agentsbenets from implementing
a variety close to their bliss point. In turn, appointment is preferred in the cases in which the
public good provision is relatively expensive and the costs exceed the agentsbenets from
implementing a variety close to their bliss point.
Due to the nature of the public goods under consideration, I consider a somewhat re-
stricted space of instruments available to the principal  she can just set up a contest but
cannot o¤er a contract for provision of the public goods. To this extent, the paper is related
to the literature on tournaments and contests, which addresses the issue of contest design (see
Konrad 2009 for an introduction to this vast literature). The paper is also related to the lit-
erature on spatial political competition going back to the seminal work of Downs (1957), who
emphasized platform convergence in a framework with two o¢ ce-motivated political candi-
dates. A further step was taken by Wittman (1977, 1983, 1990), Calvert (1985) and Roemer
(1994), who considered policy- and o¢ ce-motivated candidates. It has been shown that under
full commitment, two policy- and o¢ ce-motivated candidates announce convergent platforms
if the distribution of the votersideal policies is known (Wittman 1977, Calvert 1985, Roemer
1994, Bernhardt et al. 2009, Saporiti 2010). The present paper actually uses these results
for the case in which public good provision implies net benets for a contributing agent.
However, the case of spatial competition with net costs which I model here, has not been
analyzed in this literature, to the best of my knowledge.
This paper also contributes to the literature on voluntary provision of public goods which
goes back to the pioneering work of Samuelson (1954, 1955). More recent classical references
on pure public good provision include Bergstrom et al. (1986), Andreoni (1988), Cornes
and Sandler (1996), among many others. The net benet case studied here is also related
to the literature on impure public good provision which assumes that agents gain certain
private benets from their own contribution (see Cornes and Sandler 1984, 1994, Glazer
and Konrad 1986, Holländer 1990, Harbaugh 1998, among many others). However, the
present paper departs from a standard model of public good provision and analyzes a setting
with di¤erentiated public good in which agents di¤er in their preferences over a public good
variety to be provided. Di¤erentiated public goods have been studied by Economides and
Rose-Ackerman (1993) to model situations in which citizens have varying tastes for public
services. They demonstrate that privatization of di¤erentiated public good production is
not optimal as it leads to too many producers supplying too much output (as compared to
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the socially optimal outcome). In contrast to their research, I disregard privatization issues
and concentrate instead on the question of assignment of public good production within
organizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider a public good provision within organizations. Suppose moreover that a public good
under consideration, denoted by x, is di¤erentiated and the set of feasible outcomes is a closed
interval [0; 1].
A principal assigns the public good provision to one of the agents. I consider a benchmark
case with two agents here. The principal and the agents strictly prefer the public good to
be provided rather than not to be provided. However, they di¤er in their preferences over
variety of the public good. In particular, I assume that the principals bliss point is 12 while
the agentsbliss points 1 and 2 are such that 1 < 12 < 2. The agents thus have opposite
preferences over the di¤erentiated public good.
The principal and the agents have Euclidean preferences over x. Formally, their utility
from the di¤erentiated public good x (given bliss point ) is
  jx  j :
Thus, they want the public good variety to be close to their bliss point.
A contributing agent incurs a net cost of public good provision, denoted by C 2 R.
Negative C means that the agent actually benets from the public good provision. I assume
that the cost C and the agentsbliss points 1 and 2 are common knowledge.
The principal can adopt di¤erent selection procedures to choose an agent to provide the
public good. Here, I consider two simple and rather common selection processes. Under the
rst, referred as appointment, the principal simply evaluates the agentsproles (i.e., their
bliss points) and chooses a public good contributor on the basis of this. Under the second,
referred as competition, the principal makes the agents compete by asking about a variety
of the di¤erentiated public good they would provide if selected. I assume full commitment
here such that once selected, a contributing agent implements the public good variety he has
chosen in the competition stage.1
1One can also assume that if a contributing agent deviates from his announcement he loses credibility and
therefore carries a reputational cost, which exceeds potential benets from deviation.
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The timing of events is as follows. First, the principal decides which selection procedure
to adopt, appointment or competition. In the case of appointment, she selects one of the two
agents and assigns the public good provision to him. The selected agent then provides the
public good. In the case of competition, the agents announce to the principal which variety
of the public good they would choose. The principal then judges the agents based on their
announcements and selects one of them for the public good provision. Finally, the selected
agent implements his announcement.
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. I consider
the agentsand the principals decisions under appointment procedure rst, and under com-
petition procedure second. I turn then to the principals decision regarding the selection
process. Finally, I discuss robustness of my results.
3. Analysis
3.1. Appointment
Under appointment procedure, the principal simply selects one of the agents to provide the
public good. The analysis is straightforward in this case. I study the game backwards and
start with a contributing agents problem.
Agents problem Denote by xi a di¤erentiated public good provided by agent i = 1; 2. If
selected for the public good contribution, agent i chooses xi to maximize his net payo¤ given
by
  jxi   ij   C:
Obviously, the contributing agent then implements his own bliss point, xi = i.
Principals problem I turn now to the principals appointment problem. Given that once
selected, an agent sticks to his bliss point, the principal then appoints an agent whose bliss
point is closer to hers. Formally, the principal selects agent 1 if 1 + 2 > 1; agent 2 if
1 + 2 < 1; and is indi¤erent between the two agents if 1 + 2 = 1. The principals utility
is then
 
i   12
 ;
where i is a bliss point of the contributing agent.
I study next the case in which the principal adopts competition procedure to select a
contributing agent.
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3.2. Competition
Under competition procedure, the principal simply asks the agents which variety of the
di¤erentiated public good they would choose if selected. Then the principal selects one of the
agents to implement his announcement.
Principals problem Consider rst the principals problem. Intuitively, the principal as-
signs the public good provision to an agent whose announced variety is closer to her bliss
point 12 . Now xi denotes the announcement of agent i. Then the probability of agent 1 being
selected for the public good provision is
p1 (x1; x2) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if x1 < x2 and x1 + x2 > 1, or x1 > x2 and x1 + x2 < 1;
1
2 if x1 = x2, or x1 6= x2 and x1 + x2 = 1;
0 if x1 < x2 and x1 + x2 < 1, or x1 > x2 and x1 + x2 > 1:
The probability of agent 2 being selected is
p2 (x1; x2) = 1  p1 (x1; x2) :
As in the case of appointment, the principals decision is rather "mechanical" here. Once
the agents announce public good varieties x1 and x2, the outcome of the selection process is
decided.
Agents problem The agents announce xi to maximize their expected net payo¤s i ()
given by
1 (x1; x2) = p1 (x1; x2) (  jx1   1j   C) + p2 (x1; x2) (  jx2   1j) ;
2 (x1; x2) = p1 (x1; x2) (  jx1   2j) + p2 (x1; x2) (  jx2   2j   C) :
I search for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (x1; x2) such that
1 (x

1; x

2)  1 (x; x2) 8x 2 [0; 1] ;
2 (x

1; x

2)  2 (x1; x) 8x 2 [0; 1] :
Nonpositive cost Consider rst the case in which the net cost of public good provision
is nonpositive, C  0. This actually means that the public good provision either implies
net benet for a contributing agent (if C < 0) or at least is not costly for him (if C = 0).
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Contributing to the public good provision then becomes valuable to the agents. The model
is therefore reduced to a standard setting with policy- and o¢ ce-motivated agents analyzed
by Wittman (1990) and Calvert (1985), and predicts convergence to the bliss point of the
principal, x1 = x2 =
1
2 . Each agent is then selected for the public good provision with
probability one half. Intuitively, an agent realizes that in order to get selected, he has to
sacrice his bliss point and to announce a public good variety which the principal would
prefer to the other agents announced variety. This drives convergence in equilibrium. The
principals utility is equal to 0 in this case.
Positive cost I turn now to the case in which the net cost is positive, C > 0. The public
good provision then becomes unpopular. The agents value the assignment only as a means of
implementing a public good variety close to their bliss points. Therefore, convergence does
not occur in equilibrium. Indeed, no agent agrees to carry a cost of provision in exchange for
a public good variety that can be implemented by the other agent. The following proposition
emphasizes the non-existence of equilibrium with convergence.
Proposition 1. When the public good provision implies net costs for a contributing agent,
convergence does not occur in equilibrium.
Proof. This proposition is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium
the agents announce the same public good variety x 2 (0; 1). Each of them is selected with
probability one half and obtains a payo¤ of   jx  ij  C2 , i = 1; 2. Each agent, however, has
an incentive to deviate in order not to get selected and to obtain a payo¤ of   jx  ij, saving
the expected net cost C2 . Therefore, (x; x) is not an equilibrium. If the agents announce the
same extreme varieties (0 or 1) then an agent deviating from that extreme variety will be
selected with probability 1 or with probability 12 . Suppose that in equilibrium the agents
announce the same variety 0. The payo¤ of agent i in this case is equal to  i   C2 . Agent
2, however, is better o¤ deviating to x2 = 1. This gives agent 2 a payo¤ of  12   C2 , which is
strictly greater than  2  C2 (since 2 > 12). Thus, (0; 0) is not an equilibrium. By analogy,
(1; 1) is not an equilibrium as agent 1 is better o¤ deviating to x1 = 0; this yields a payo¤
of  12   C2 , which is strictly greater than 1   1   C2 (since 1 < 12). There is therefore no
equilibrium with convergence of announced public good varieties.
Proposition 1 stresses an important feature of the positive cost case a lack of announce-
ment convergence. It implies therefore that in equilibrium the agents announce divergent
varieties. In what follows, to prevent bizarre outcomes (such as agent 1s announcing agent
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2s bliss point or vice versa), I restrict the set of choices available to the agents in the following
way: x1 2

0; 12

, x2 2

1
2 ; 1

.
Consider now the case in which the net cost of public good provision is larger than the
length of the set of feasible outcomes, i.e., C > 1. For such large C, each agent prefers any
variety provided by the other agent to the cost of providing public good himself. He thus
has an incentive to announce the most extreme variety from his set of available outcomes. It
is easy to show that for C > 1, there is a unique equilibrium in which the agents announce
extreme symmetric varieties (0; 1) and each gets selected with probability one half. The
principals expected utility is equal to  12 .
Consider next the non-trivial case in which the net cost of public good provision does
not exceed the length of the set of feasible outcomes, C  1. The following proposition
characterizes an equilibrium in which the agents announce symmetric (around 12) varieties
and each gets selected with probability one half. (The proof of this and other propositions
can be found in the Appendix.)
Proposition 2. There is a unique equilibrium with symmetric varieties
 
1 C
2 ;
1+C
2

when
C 2 (0; 1), 1 2

0; 1 C2

, 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1

. There is a unique equilibrium with symmetric
varieties (0; 1) when C = 1, 1 2

0; 12

, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

.
Therefore, in this equilibrium, when C 2 (0; 1) the agents announce more moderate
varieties than their bliss points 1 and 2. The announcements are symmetric around 12
and at a distance of C from each other. Each agent gets selected with probability one
half. The expected utility of the principal is  C2 . The expected payo¤ for agent i is equal to
  12   i C2 . No agent wants to deviate by announcing a more moderate variety and getting
selected for the public good provision. The reason is that the gains in terms of implemented
variety (which are less than C2 ) do not compensate the losses in terms of net cost
C
2 . Neither
agent gains by announcing a more extreme variety and not being selected. This is because
the gains in terms of net cost C2 are equal to the losses in terms of implemented variety of
the public good. When C = 1, the agents announce the most extreme varieties (0; 1). In this
case, no agent wants to deviate by announcing a less extreme variety and getting selected,
as the losses in terms of net cost C2 =
1
2 would exceed the gains in terms of the public good
variety. The principals expected utility is given by  12 in this case.
I turn now to the characterization of equilibria in which the agents announce asymmetric
varieties and one agent gets selected with probability one. The following lemma establishes
an important property of equilibria with asymmetric announcements.
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Lemma 1. In an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements, the selected agent necessarily
announces his most preferred variety of the public good.
Proof. This lemma is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that there is an equilibrium
in which the selected agent, say i, announces a variety xi 6= i. Agent i, however, can always
protably deviate to the direction of his bliss point i by a small positive number " and still
get selected. It follows that in an equilibrium with asymmetric varieties, the selected agent
announces his bliss point.
An equilibrium (x1; x2) in which the agents announce asymmetric varieties must therefore
have one of the two following structures:
1. (1; x2) such that x2 > 1   1. Agent 1 gets selected, i.e., p1 (1; x2) = 1. The
principals utility is 1   12 .
2. (x1; 2) such that x1 < 1   2. Agent 2 gets selected, i.e., p2 (x1; 2) = 1. The
principals utility is 12   2.
The following proposition characterizes equilibria with asymmetric announcements.
Proposition 3. For the following values of C, 1, 2 and x2, there is an equilibrium with
asymmetric announcements (1; x2) in which agent 1 gets selected for the public good pro-
vision:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
max

0; 1 2C2
	
; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1 + C

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 = 1 C2 ; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1:
For the following values of C, 1, 2 and x1, there is an equilibrium with asymmetric
announcements (x1; 2) in which agent 2 gets selected:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1
2 ;max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 = 1+C2 ; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ;min

1; 1+2C2
	
; 1 2

2   C; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C = 1; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0:
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It is important to stress here that in some cases there is a continuum of payo¤-equivalent
equilibria with asymmetric announcements in which one agent, say i, announces his bliss
point i, gets selected for the public good provision, and obtains a payo¤ of  C, while the
other agent, j, announces any variety from an equilibrium interval and obtains a payo¤ of
  jj   ij, i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. I refer to such a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria as one
equilibrium, specifying that agent j can choose any platform from an equilibrium interval.
Note that the agents problem is symmetric and therefore equilibria with asymmetric
announcements are symmetric around 12 . In other words, if there is an equilibrium in which
agent 1 gets selected for the pair of bliss points 1 and 2, then there is an equilibrium in
which agent 2 gets selected for the pair of bliss points 1  2 and 1  1.
Consider an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which, say, agent 1 gets se-
lected, (1; x2). (The intuition for an equilibrium in which agent 2 gets selected is analogous.)
Agent 2s announced variety is more extreme than agent 1s, i.e., x2 > 1 1. Agent 1 imple-
ments his bliss point and therefore obtains  C. He has no incentive to deviate by announcing
a more extreme variety and getting selected only with probability 12 or not being selected at
all. In this case, the gains in terms of net cost of public good provision (C2 if selected with
probability 12 or C if not selected) do not compensate the losses in terms of implemented
variety of the public good (x2   12 if selected with probability 12 or x2   1 if not selected)
for x2 specied in Proposition 3. Agent 2 is not selected and obtains a payo¤ of 1 2. He
would not deviate by announcing a less extreme variety and getting selected with probability
1
2 or 1. Indeed, in this case, agent 2 would carry a net cost (
C
2 if selected with probability
1
2
or C if selected with probability 1) that exceeds the gains in terms of implemented variety
(min f2; 1  1g   12 if selected with probability 12 or 2   1 if selected with probability 1)
for the parameter values specied in Proposition 3.
I summarize the results of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 for C > 0 as follows.
i) When the net cost of public good provision is larger than the length of the set of feasible
outcomes (C > 1), there is a unique equilibrium in which the agents announce extreme
symmetric varieties (0; 1).
ii) When the net cost of public good provision equals the length of the set of feasible outcomes
(C = 1), there is an equilibrium with extreme symmetric announcements (0; 1) for any
1 2

0; 12

and 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. Moreover, there are two equilibria with asymmetric
announcements (1; 1) and (0; 2) when the agentsbliss points are not extreme, i.e.,
when 1 2
 
0; 12

and 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. If agent 1 is extreme (1 = 0), there is an equilibrium
(0; 2). If agent 2 is extreme (2 = 1), there is an equilibrium (1; 1).
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iii) When the net cost of public good provision is lower than the length of the set of feasible
outcomes (C < 1), depending on the agentsbliss points there are either one or two
equilibria. If the distance between the agentsbliss points does not exceed the net cost
(2   1  C) and the agents are not extreme (1 6= 0 and 2 6= 1), then there are
two equilibria with asymmetric announcements whereby the selected agent chooses his
bliss point and the other agent chooses any variety from a certain equilibrium interval.
Otherwise, there is a unique equilibrium: if 1 2

0; 1 C2

and 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1

this
is an equilibrium with symmetric announcements
 
1 C
2 ;
1+C
2

; otherwise, this is an
equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which a less extreme agent announces
his bliss point and gets selected and the other agent announces any variety from a
certain equilibrium interval.
Table 1 in the Appendix describes equilibria for C = 1. When C = 1, there is an
equilibrium with extreme symmetric announcements (0; 1). Moreover, when C = 1 and
the agents are not extreme, i.e., 1 6= 0 and 2 6= 1, there are two more equilibria with
asymmetric varieties (1; 1) and (0; 2). If one of the agents is extreme, only one equilibrium
with asymmetric varieties arises for C = 1: (0; 2) when 1 = 0 or (1; 1) when 2 = 1.
Equilibria for C 2 (0; 1) are formally described in Table 2 in the Appendix. Furthermore,
Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix represent equilibria for C 2  0; 12 and C 2  12 ; 1, respec-
tively. The horizontal axis depicts the bliss point of agent 1, 1 2

0; 12

, and the vertical
axis depicts that of agent 2, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. The dashed lines represent the boundaries of open
sets. Figures 1 and 2 specify how many and what equilibria there are for each pair of agents
bliss points (1; 2) 2

0; 12
  12 ; 1.
Note that if the distance between the agentsbliss points is greater than the net cost C,
i.e., 2 1 > C, or if one of the agents has an extreme bliss point, i.e., 1 = 0 or 2 = 1, then
there is just one equilibrium for C 2 (0; 1). Otherwise, there are two equilibria. The reason
is that when 2   1 > C, only the agent with a less extreme bliss point gets selected in an
equilibrium with asymmetric announcements. If the agent with a more extreme bliss point
gets selected, this cannot be equilibrium with asymmetric varieties since the agent with a less
extreme bliss point would like to deviate to get selected. Indeed, the losses in terms of net
cost C if selected are less than the gains in terms of implemented public good variety 2 1.
However, when 2 1  C, there are two equilibria with asymmetric announcements, since
both the agent with a less extreme bliss point and the agent with a more extreme bliss point
can be selected for the public good provision.
Consider rst an equilibrium in which the agent with a less extreme bliss point gets
12
selected. He does not have incentive to deviate in order to get selected with probability 12
or not to get selected at all. Indeed, by deviating he might avoid the cost of public good
provision but incurs even larger losses in terms of implemented public good variety. The other
agent does not have incentive to deviate either. Intuitively, since the agentsbliss points are
not very distinct then in equilibrium, he su¤ers just a modest loss in term of implemented
public good variety. By deviating he somewhat reduces this loss but carries even larger costs
of public good provision.
The other equilibrium in which a less moderate agent announces his bliss point and gets
selected is apparently more counterintuitive. Indeed, why wouldnt a more moderate agent
deviate and announce his bliss point? He could then get selected and implement his preferred
variety of the public good. But the same intuition works here. Since the agentspreferred
varieties are rather moderate and not very distinct, the more moderate agent gets a rather
small utility loss from the equilibrium variety of the public good. By deviating to his bliss
point he would get selected, implement his bliss point, and therefore slightly increase his
utility from the di¤erentiated public good. However, he would also incur the cost of public
good provision C, which exceeds his gains from implementing his preferred variety 2   1.
I must emphasize again that an equilibrium in which a less moderate agent announces his
bliss point and gets selected doesnt arise when the distance between the agentsbliss points
exceeds the net cost of public good provision. In this case, a more moderate agent could
protably deviate to his bliss point as his gains in terms of implemented public good variety
would exceed the net cost of public good provision.
3.3. Principals Decision regarding Selection Process
I turn next to the principals decision regarding the selection procedure. Given the agents
bliss points 1 and 2, and the net cost of public good provision C, the principal chooses
between appointment and competition. In what follows, b denotes a more moderate bliss
point out of 1 and 2.
Under appointment, a more moderate agent ends up providing his preferred public good
variety. The principals utility is then equal to   b  12  for any tuple of 1, 2 and C.
Under competition, a selected agent provides a public good variety he has announced in the
competition stage. The following table summarizes the principals expected utility in this
case:
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Parameter values: Principals expected utility under competition:
C > 1  12 ;
C = 1
 12
  2   12  and/or   1   12  for some 1 and 2;
2   1  C < 1
  b  12  if either 1 = 0 or 2 = 1
  2   12  and   1   12  otherwise;
0 < C < 2   1
 C2 if 1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2
  b  12  otherwise;
C  0 0:
The rst line corresponds to the case in which the net cost of public good provision is
larger than the set of feasible outcomes, C > 1. In this case, under competition the agents
make themselves an unattractive choice by choosing extreme varieties of the public good.
The principal therefore prefers appointment to competition.
The second line reects the case in which the net cost of public good provision equals
the set of feasible outcomes, C = 1. Under competition, for any pair of the agentsbliss
points 1 and 2, there is an equilibrium with extreme announcements as in the previous
case. Moreover, there might be other equilibria for some 1 and 2. But in none of those
the principals payo¤ exceeds   b  12 . She therefore prefers appointment to competition in
this case.
The third line of the table deals with the case in which the net cost of public good provision
is lower than the length of the set of feasible outcomes but exceeds the distance between the
agentsbliss points (2 1  C < 1). Under competition, there is an asymmetric equilibrium
in which the principals utility is exactly   b  12  as under appointment procedure. However,
for most pairs of the agentsbliss points 1 and 2, there is another asymmetric equilibrium
in which the principals utility is strictly lower than   b  12 . The principal thus adopts
appointment procedure in this case.
Consider now the fourth line which corresponds to the case in which the net cost of public
good provision is strictly positive but does not exceed the distance between the agentsbliss
points (0 < C < 2   1). In this case, under competition there is a unique equilibrium
with divergent announcements (either symmetric or asymmetric depending on the parameter
values) in which the principals utility exceeds or equals   b  12 . The principal therefore
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prefers competition to appointment in this case.
Finally, the last line of the table deals with the case of nonpositive production costs, i.e.,
benets (C  0). Here, under competition the agents want to make themselves an attractive
choice by announcing the principals preferred variety. As a result, the principal adopts
competition procedure. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4. The principal uses appointment when the cost of public good provision is
greater than or equal to the distance between the agentsbliss points (C  2   1).
She uses competition when the cost of public good provision is lower than the distance
between the agentsbliss points (C < 2   1).
Intuitively, under competition procedure, the agents face a standard cost-benet trade-
o¤. Providing public good implies certain costs for a contributing agent but at the same time
allows him to choose a public good variety closer to his bliss point. Obviously, when the cost
exceeds the distance between the agentsbliss points (C  2   1) each agent prefers his
counterpart to be selected and thus public good provision becomes unpopular. The agents
(for some parameter values just one of them) tend to make themselves an unattractive choice
and announce extreme varieties of the public good. The principal therefore picks appointment
procedure to avoid extreme outcomes. However, when the cost is lower than the distance
between the agents bliss points (C < 2   1) neither agent would let his counterpart
implement his preferred public good variety. In this case, the agents value the opportunity to
provide the public good which makes them to announce more moderate varieties than their
bliss points. The principal then picks competition procedure and ends up with a moderate
variety of the public good.
3.4. Robustness
In this section, I relax some of the important assumptions of the model and discuss robustness
of my results.
Exit of the agents Assume now that the agents are allowed to exit the competition stage.
Intuitively, the agents have incentive to exit only when production of the public good is
an unpopular job. However, when the agents value the opportunity to implement a public
good variety close to their bliss point, they dont want to exit the competition stage. In
Appendix C, I formally show that for C < 2   1 neither agent has incentive to exit, while
for C  2   1 at least one of the agents prefers to exit. Therefore, allowing exit a¤ects
outcomes of the competition stage only when C  2 1. Note however that the principals
15
decision regarding the selection procedure stays una¤ected in this case. Indeed, even if exit
is allowed in the competition stage, the principal still adopts appointment procedure for
C  2   1.
To see this, consider rst the case of large costs (C > 1) in which there is a unique
equilibrium (0; 1) of the competition stage and both agents have incentive to exit. The
agents strictly prefer the public good to be provided rather than not. Therefore, in the
simultaneous exit game, only one of the agents ends up exiting.2 If a more extreme agent
exits then a more moderate agent announces his preferred variety in the competition stage and
gets selected for public good provision. The principal is then indi¤erent between appointment
and competition. However, if a more moderate agent exits then a more extreme agent gets
selected. The principal then strictly prefers appointment to competition (as when exit is not
allowed).
Consider next the case of C = 1 in which there are up to 3 equilibria depending on the
parameter values. A symmetric equilibrium (0; 1) is discussed in the previous paragraph. In
equilibrium (0; 2) agent 2 has incentive to exit. If agent 2 is a more extreme agent then his
exit implies that a more moderate agent 1 will be selected in the competition stage. Therefore,
the principal will be indi¤erent between appointment and competition. However, if agent 2
is a more moderate agent then his exit leads to a more extreme variety being implemented
by agent 1. The principal then strictly prefers appointment to competition. The similar
intuition works in the case of equilibrium (1; 1) in which agent 1 has incentive to exit. It
follows therefore that for C = 1 the principal prefers appointment to competition (as if exit
is not allowed).
Finally, I turn to the case of 2 1  C < 1. Here there are either one or two asymmetric
equilibria in which one of the agents announces his bliss point, gets selected, but would readily
exit the competition stage if allowed. If he is a more extreme agent then his exit would lead
to a more moderate variety being implemented. This would make the principal indi¤erent
between appointment and competition. However, if he is a more moderate agent then his
exit would result in a more extreme variety being chosen. The principal would then prefer
appointment to competition.
I can conclude therefore that my results hold when exit is allowed in the competition
stage.
Preferences of the principal In the model, I assume that the principals bliss point is 12 .
As a result, the principal is indi¤erent between extreme varieties 0 and 1. Relaxing this
2For simplicity, I disregard coordination issues here.
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assumption a¤ects some results of the competition stage. In particular, Proposition 1 about
the lack of convergence in the competition stage no longer holds. Indeed, if the principal
strictly prefers one extreme variety, say 0, to the other, 1, then for su¢ ciently large C it
is easy to construct a convergent equilibrium, (1; 1), in the competition stage. To see this,
suppose that the agents announce the same varieties (1; 1). Agent is payo¤ is then equal to
  (1  i)  C2 . If agent i deviates to i then he gets a payo¤ of  C. He has no incentive to
deviate if   (1  i)  C2   C, which holds if 1 < C  2 and 1  1  C2 and if C > 2. By
analogy, if the principal prefers variety 1 to 0 then for 1 < C  2 and 2  C2 and for C > 2,
there is a convergent equilibrium (0; 0). However, this convergence result does not a¤ect the
principals decision regarding the selection procedure. Indeed, in this case the principal still
prefers appointment to competition in order to avoid extreme outcomes.
Note moreover that relaxing the assumption about symmetry of the principals preferences
does not change the results for C  1 either. Indeed, the equilibrium structure of the
competition stage stays una¤ected. (However, particular quantitative characteristics of the
equilibria might change.) Still, the principal will prefer competition when the agents value
the opportunity to provide a public good (i.e., when C < 2   1), and appointment when
the agents want to avoid it (i.e., when C  2 1). It follows therefore that my results hold
when the assumption about symmetry of the principals preferences is relaxed.
4. Conclusion
This paper builds a simple model of provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an organi-
zation. A principal can adopt di¤erent procedures (appointment or competition) to select one
of two agents for the public good production. The agents have extreme opposite preferences
over the di¤erentiated public good while the principal prefers a moderate variety. Under ap-
pointment, the principal just observes the agentspreferences and selects a contributor on the
basis of this. Obviously, an agent with the preferences closer to those of the principal will be
selected in this case. In turn, under competition, the agents announce public good varieties
they commit to provide if selected. If the public good provision is quite costly then the agents
want to avoid being selected and so make themselves an unattractive choice by announcing
extreme varieties. The principal then prefers appointment to competition. However, if the
public good provision is not very costly then each agent values (and therefore compete for)
the chance to choose a public good variety closer to that he prefers the most. The agents
thus want to make themselves an attractive choice and announce moderate varieties. The
principal prefers competition to appointment in this case.
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Even though the model is very stylized, it yields an empirically testable prediction. My
results suggest that appointment is preferred in the cases in which provision of a di¤erentiated
public good implies considerable costs for a contributing agent and doesnt pay o¤ in terms
of a public good variety. In turn, competition is preferred when provision of a di¤erentiated
public good is not so costly and pays o¤ in terms of a public good variety. Therefore, a simple
testable hypothesis might be as follows. Within organizations, production of unpopular public
goods is simply assigned while production of popular public goods is contested.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a pair of varieties (x1; x2) such that x1 = 1   x2, x1 2
 
0; 12

, x2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. Given
these x1 and x2, each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 1s payo¤ is
equal to 1 (x1; x2) = 12 (  jx1   1j   C) + 12 (  jx2   1j). Agent 2s payo¤ is equal to
2 (x1; x2) =
1
2 (  jx1   2j) + 12 (  jx2   2j   C).
1. If agent 1 deviates and announces a variety x01 2 [0; x1), then he is not selected and
gets the payo¤ 1 (x01; x2) =   jx2   1j. Such a deviation is not protable only if
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2), which yields   jx1   1j   C    (1  x1   1). If agent 1
deviates and announces a variety x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

, then he is selected and gets the payo¤
1 (x
00
1; x2) =   jx001   1j   C. Such a deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; x2) 
1 (x
00
1; x2), which implies
1
2 (  jx1   1j   C) + 12 ( 1 + x1 + 1)    jx001   1j   C.
a) Consider the case where x1 < 1. The conditions 1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2) and
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x001; x2) become 1  1 C2 and x1  1 C2  jx001   1j, respectively.
To guarantee that the latter inequality holds for each x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

, it is required
that x1  1 C2 . It follows then that 1  1 C2  x1, which does not hold for
x1 < 1. Therefore, when x1 < 1, agent 1 can deviate protably.
b) Consider the case where x1  1. The conditions 1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2) and
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x001; x2) become x1  1 C2 and x001  1 C2 , respectively. The latter
inequality holds for each x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

only if x1 = 1 C2 (where C < 1). Indeed, if
x1 <
1 C
2 then there is x
00
1 2
 
x1;
1 C
2

that implies that agent 1 has a protable
deviation. Therefore, agent 1 will not deviate only if 1  1 C2 and x1 = 1 C2 ,
where C < 1.
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2. If agent 2 deviates and announces a variety x02 2 (x2; 1], then he is not selected and
gets the payo¤ 2 (x1; x02) =   jx1   2j. Such a deviation is not protable only if
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02), which implies   jx2   2j   C  1   x2   2. If agent 2
deviates and announces a variety x002 2

1
2 ; x2

, then he is selected and his payo¤becomes
2 (x1; x
00
2) =   jx002   2j   C. This deviation is not protable only if 2 (x1; x2) 
2 (x1; x
00
2), which yields
1
2 (1  x2   2) + 12 (  jx2   2j   C)    jx002   2j   C.
a) Consider the case where x2 > 2. The conditions 2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02) and
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x002) become 2  1+C2 and x2  1+C2 + jx002   2j, respectively.
To guarantee that the latter inequality holds for each x002 2

1
2 ; x2

, it is necessary
that x2  1+C2 . Therefore, x2  1+C2  2, which is not possible for x2 > 2.
Therefore, agent 2 has protable deviations when x2 > 2.
b) Consider the case where x2  2. The conditions 2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02) and
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x002) become x2  1+C2 and x002  1+C2 , respectively. The latter
inequality holds for each x002 2

1
2 ; x2

only if x2 = 1+C2 (where C < 1). Indeed, if
x2 >
1+C
2 then there is x
00
2 2
 
1+C
2 ; x2

that means that agent 2 has a protable
deviation. Thus, agent 2 will not deviate only if 2  1+C2 and x2 = 1+C2 , where
C < 1.
Therefore, both agents do not deviate from (x1; x2) such that x1 = 1   x2, x1 2
 
0; 12

,
x2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

only if 1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2 , and x1 = 1 C2 , x2 = 1+C2 , where C < 1. In
other words, there is a unique equilibrium with symmetric announcements
 
1 C
2 ;
1+C
2

when
1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2 , C < 1.
Consider now a pair of announcements (0; 1). Each agent gets selected with probability
one-half. The agentspayo¤s are equal to i (0; 1) =  12   C2 , i = 1; 2. If agent i deviates and
announces a less extreme variety x0i, he is selected and gets the payo¤i (x
0
i; ) =   jx0i   ij 
C. Note that i (x0i; ) takes its maximum value  C when x0i = i. To guarantee that agent i
has no protable deviations it is required i (0; 1)  max i (x0i; ), which amounts to C  1.
Therefore, (0; 1) is an equilibrium for C  1.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Characterization of an equilibrium in which the agents announce asymmetric
varieties and agent 1 gets selected.
Consider a pair of announcements (1; x2) such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and x2 2 (1  1; 1].
Given those, agent 1 is selected for the public good provision and gets the payo¤1 (1; x2) =
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 C. The payo¤ of agent 2 is equal to 2 (1; x2) =   j1   2j.
1. If agent 1 deviates and announces a variety x01 2
 
1  x2; 12

, then he still gets selected
and his payo¤becomes1 (x01; x2) =   jx01   1j C. However, 1 (x01; x2) < 1 (1; x2)
and so such a deviation is not protable. If agent 1 deviates and announces a variety
1 x2, then each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 1s payo¤becomes
1 (1  x2; x2) = 12 (  j1  x2   1j   C) + 12 (  jx2   1j). Such a deviation is not
protable only if 1 (1; x2)  1 (1  x2; x2), which implies x2  1+C2 , where C  1.
Consider the case where x2 6= 1. If agent 1 deviates and announces x001 2 [0; 1  x2),
then he is not selected and gets the payo¤ 1 (x001; x2) =   jx2   1j. Such a deviation
is not protable only if 1 (1; x2)  1 (x001; x2), which yields x2  1 +C. Therefore,
when the agents announce (1; x2) such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and x2 2 (1  1; 1), agent 1
has no protable deviations only if x2  max

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
, where C < 1. When the
agents announce (1; 1) such that 1 2
 
0; 12

, agent 1 has no protable deviations only
if C  1.
2. If agent 2 deviates and announces 1   1, then each agent gets selected with prob-
ability one-half. The payo¤ of agent 2 becomes 2 (1; 1  1) = 12 (  j1   2j) +
1
2 (  j1  1   2j   C). Such a deviation is not protable only if2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1),
which amounts to 1   2    j1  1   2j   C. If agent 2 deviates and announces
x02 2

1
2 ; 1  1

, then he gets selected and his payo¤ is 2 (1; x02) =   jx02   2j   C.
This deviation is not protable only if 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02), which implies 1 2 
  jx02   2j   C.
a) Consider the case where 2 < 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 2  1+C2 and 2  1 + C, respectively.
It implies therefore that in case 2 < 1   1, agent 2 will not deviate only if
2  min

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
.
b) Consider the case where 2 = 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 2  1 +C and x02  1 +C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since x02 <
1 1 = 2  1 +C. It means that in case 2 = 1 1, agent 2 will not deviate
only if 2  1 + C, which amounts to 1  1 C2 .
c) Consider the case where 2 > 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 1  1 C2 and x02  1 + C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since the
20
former inequality implies 1   1  1 + C, and therefore x02 < 1   1  1 + C.
It follows then that in case 2 > 1  1, agent 2 has no protable deviations only
if 1  1 C2 .
Therefore, when the agents announce (1; x2) such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and x2 2 (1  1; 1],
agent 2 has no protable deviations only in the following cases: either 2 < 1 1 and
2  min

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
or 2  1  1 and 1  1 C2 .
Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither agent has protable deviations
yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announce-
ments (1; x2) with agent 1 selected for the public good provision:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
max

0; 1 2C2
	
; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1 + C

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 = 1 C2 ; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1:
Characterization of an equilibrium in which the agents announce asymmetric
varieties and agent 2 gets selected.
Consider a pair of announcements (x1; 2) such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and x1 2 [0; 1  2).
Given those, agent 2 is selected and gets the payo¤ 2 (x1; 2) =  C. The payo¤ of agent 1
is equal to 1 (x1; 2) =   j2   1j.
1. If agent 2 deviates and announces a variety x02 2

1
2 ; 1  x1

, then he still gets selected
and his payo¤becomes2 (x1; x02) =   jx02   2j C. However, 2 (x1; x02) < 2 (x1; 2)
and so such a deviation is not protable. If agent 2 deviates and announces a variety
1 x1, then each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 2s payo¤becomes
2 (x

1; 1  x1) = 12 (  jx1   2j) + 12 (  j1  x1   2j   C). Such a deviation is not
protable only if 2 (x1; 2)  2 (x1; 1  x1), which implies x1  1 C2 , where C  1.
Consider the case where x1 6= 0. If agent 2 deviates and announces x002 2 (1  x1; 1], then
he is not selected and his payo¤ becomes 2 (x1; x002) =   jx1   2j. Such a deviation
is not protable only if 2 (x1; 2)  2 (x1; x002), which yields x1  2  C. Therefore,
when the agents announce (x1; 2) such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and x1 2 (0; 1  2), agent 2
has no protable deviations only if x1  min

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
, where C < 1. When the
agents announce (0; 2) such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

, agent 2 has no protable deviations only
if C  1.
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2. If agent 1 deviates and announces 1 2, then each agent gets selected with probability
one-half. The payo¤ of agent 1 becomes 1 (1  2; 2) = 12 (  j1  2   1j   C) +
1
2 (  j2   1j). Such a deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2),
which amounts to 1   2    j1  2   1j   C. If agent 1 deviates and announces
x01 2
 
1  2; 12

, then he is selected and gets the payo¤ 1 (x01; 2) =   jx01   1j   C.
This deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2), which implies 1 2 
  jx01   1j   C.
a) Consider the case where 1 > 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 1  1 C2 and 1  2   C, respectively.
It implies therefore that in case 1 > 1   2, agent 1 will not deviate only if
1  max

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
.
b) Consider the case where 1 = 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 1  2  C and x01  2  C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since x01 >
1 2 = 1  2 C. It means that in case 1 = 1 2, agent 1 will not deviate
only if 1  2   C, which amounts to 2  1+C2 .
c) Consider the case where 1 < 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 2  1+C2 and x01  2   C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since the
former inequality implies 1   2  2   C, and therefore x01 > 1   2  2   C.
It follows then that in case 1 < 1  2, agent 1 has no protable deviations only
if 2  1+C2 .
Therefore, when the agents announce (x1; 2) such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and x1 2 [0; 1  2),
agent 1 has no protable deviations only in the following cases: either 1 > 1 2 and
1  max

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
or 1  1  2 and 2  1+C2 .
Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither agent has protable deviations
yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announce-
ments (x1; 2) with agent 2 selected for the public good provision:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1
2 ;max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 = 1+C2 ; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ;min

1; 1+2C2
	
; 1 2

2   C; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C = 1; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0:
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C. Exit of the Agents in the Competition Stage
If one of the agents, say agent i, exits the competition stage, then agent j can announce his
preferred variety and still get selected. Agent is payo¤ is then equal to   jj   ij.
I calculate next agent is payo¤ in the case he does not exit. I consider ve di¤erent
combinations of the parameter values.
1. When C > 1 there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (0; 1). Agent is payo¤ is  C2   12
which is strictly lower than   jj   ij. Agent i therefore prefers to exit the competition
stage.
2. When C = 1 there is a symmetric equilibrium (0; 1). As discussed in the previous case,
agent i will exit competition. For C = 1, 1 2
 
0; 12

, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

there is also an
asymmetric equilibrium (1; 1) in which agent 1s payo¤ is equal to  C and agent 2s
payo¤ is   j1   2j. Agent 1 will exit in this case. For C = 1, 1 2

0; 12

, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

there is also an asymmetric equilibrium (0; 2) in which agent 1s payo¤ is   j2   1j
and agent 2s payo¤ is  C. Agent 2 prefers to exit competition.
3. When 2   1  C < 1 there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which a more moderate
agent announces his bliss point in the competition stage and gets selected. His payo¤ is
then  C which is lower than   jj   ij. He therefore prefers to exit the competition
stage. Moreover, for most pairs of the agentsbliss points 1 and 2, there is another
asymmetric equilibrium in which a more extreme agent announces his bliss point, gets
selected and gets payo¤ of  C which is lower than   jj   ij. He then prefers to exit.
4. When 0 < C < 2   1 there is a unique equilibrium in the competition stage. For
1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2 , it is a symmetric equilibrium in which agent is payo¤ is equal to
 C2  
1
2   i
 which exceeds   jj   ij. Neither agent then wants to exit competition.
Otherwise, it is an asymmetric equilibrium in which a more moderate agent gets payo¤
of  C (which is higher than   jj   ij) while a more extreme agent gets payo¤ of
  jj   ij. Neither agent has incentive to exit.
5. Finally, when C  0 there is a unique convergent equilibrium  12 ; 12. Agent is payo¤
is  C2  
1
2   i
 which exceeds   jj   ij. Neither agent exits the competition stage
in this case.
To summarize, for C < 2   1 agents have no incentive to exit the competition stage.
However, for C  2   1 at least one of the agents does prefer to exit.
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Values of the parameters C, 1 and 2: Equilibria:
C = 1; 1 = 0; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

(0; 2), (0; 1) ;
C = 1; 2 = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

(1; 1), (0; 1) ;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

(1; 1), (0; 2), (0; 1) ;
C = 1; 1 = 0; 2 = 1 (0; 1) :
Table 1. Equilibria for C = 1.
Values of the parameters C, 1 and 2: 1 equilibrium:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

0; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ; 1
  
1 C
2 ;
1+C
2

;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2 [0; 2   C) (x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2 (C + 1; 1] (1; x2), x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 = 0; 2 2  12 ; C (0; 2) ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 2 = 1; 1 2 1  C; 12 (1; 1) ;
2 equilibria:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

2   C; 1 C2
 (1; x2), x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
(x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
 (1; x2), x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
(x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ;  1 = 1 C2 ; 2 = 1+C2 [ 
1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2
 (1; x2), x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
(x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2  0; 1 C2  ; 2 2  12 ; C (1; x2), x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
(0; 2) ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2  1 C2 ; 1  C ; 2 2  12 ; C (1; x2), x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
(0; 2) ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2  12 ; C (1; 1) ;
(0; 2) ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2  C; 1+C2  (1; 1) ;
(x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2 1+C2 ; 1 (1; 1) ;
(x1; 2), x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
Table 2. Equilibria for C 2 (0; 1).
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